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ABSTRACT 
For 20 years, the City of Juneau has collected passenger fees from cruise lines 
that enter its port. These fees are assessed based on the number of passengers 
that arrive on each cruise vessel, and amount to $8.00 per passenger. On 
December 6, 2018, in Cruise Lines International Association Alaska v. 
The City and Borough of Juneau, the U.S. District Court of Alaska held that 
Juneau’s use of the passenger fees violates the U.S. Constitution’s Tonnage 
Clause. Rather than appeal the decision, the City of Juneau subsequently settled 
the litigation with the cruise lines. This Note will examine Juneau’s passenger 
fees in light of the Tonnage Clause. It will argue that because Juneau and the 
State of Alaska depend on these fees and other tourism revenue, Alaska 
policymakers should lobby Congress to use its Tonnage Clause authorizing 
powers to grant Alaska port cities the authority to charge set passenger fees to 
visiting cruise lines. Part One will analyze the Court’s historical 
understanding of the Tonnage Clause. Part Two will examine the litigation, 
the court’s decision in Cruise Lines International, and the recent settlement 
between the City and the cruise lines. Part Three will consider how this case 
may disrupt Alaska’s tourism industry and economy and will focus on other 
Alaska laws that may be invalidated on the basis of this decision. Part Four will 
propose a model law for passage by Congress, to help Alaska work around the 
holding in Cruise Lines International. 
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Just off the boat, cruise line tourists visiting Juneau may explore the 
city’s downtown shops, restaurants, and other local amenities. They may 
meander down Franklin Street and head to the nearby waterfront 
Seawalk bordering the scenic harbor.1 Seasonal crossing guards usher 
more than 1,000,000 visitors along this journey during peak tourist 
season—from May to September.2 At the far end of the Seawalk, visitors 
are greeted by vast mountains; the harbor water curves through these 
mountains and extends beyond view. On the journey back into town, the 
Seawalk culminates at the base of a life-size, bronze statue of a humpback 
whale.3 A fountain and an array of lights decorate the whale—the 
brainchild of former Juneau mayors Bill Overstreet and Bruce Botelho.4 
According to Cruise Lines International Association Alaska 
(CLIAA), the trade association that represents cruise lines operating in 
Alaska, much of this downtown infrastructure has been funded 
inappropriately.5 The Seawalk and seasonal crossing guards, along with 
the recent upgrades to Franklin Street, Front Street, and the downtown 
area, are all on a long list of items that CLIAA believes have been financed 
illicitly through a misappropriation of funds collected from cruise 
passengers.6 The passenger fees that Juneau charges the cruise lines 
amount to $8.00 per passenger entering the port and total more than 
 
 1.  CITY/BOROUGH OF JUNEAU ALASKA’S CAPITAL CITY, ENG’G DEP’T, MARINE 
PARK/SEAWALK PROJECT, http://www.juneau.org/engineering/Marine_Park/ 
MarinePark.php (describing the marine sea walk project) (last visited Feb. 23, 
2019). 
 2.  MCDOWELL GROUP, ALASKA VISITORS STATISTIC PROGRAM 7 − SUMMER 2016: 
SECTION 12 – SUMMARY OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMMUNITY, AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 12-1 (2016), https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/ 
Portals/6/pub/TourismResearch/AVSP/2016/12.%20AVSP%207%20Summ%2
0Profiles%20Southeast.pdf?ver=2017-06-06-133940-030. Of more than 1,200,000 
visitors to the Alaska Southeast region, over ninety percent of people visiting 
Juneau, Ketchikan, Skagway, Glacier Bay, and Hoonah were cruise tourists. Id. at 
1−2. 
 3.  Gregory Philson, Whale Worth the Wait: Lights, Fountain Complete Full-size 
Bronze Whale Statue Downtown, JUNEAU EMPIRE (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.juneauempire.com/news/whale-worth-the-wait-lights-fountain-
complete-full-size-bronze-whale-statue-downtown/. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2−3, Cruise Lines Int’l 
Ass’n Alaska v. City & Borough of Juneau, Alaska, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH (D. 
Alaska Apr. 13, 2016) (No. 1). 
 6.  See id. (noting that CLIAA alleges that the proceeds generated from entry 
fees were misappropriated); see also Sam DeGrave, Lawsuit Looms Heavier over 
Chamber Luncheon, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.juneau 
empire.com/news/lawsuit-looms-heavy-over-chamber-luncheon/ (describing 
CLIAA President John Brinkley’s announcement of the litigation against Juneau). 
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$8,000,000 every year.7 CLIAA believes that under the U.S. Constitution,8 
these funds must be used on projects more directly related to the cruise 
lines’ well-being.9 In 2016, CLIAA sued to enjoin the City from further 
collecting and misusing the passenger fees.10 CLIAA pointed to the large 
bronze whale as a symbol of the City’s excess.11 
On December 6, 2018, in Cruise Lines International Association Alaska 
v. The City and Borough of Juneau,12 the U.S. District Court of Alaska 
announced its opinion that Juneau’s use of the passenger fees violates the 
U.S. Constitution’s Tonnage Clause.13 The Tonnage Clause says that “No 
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage.”14 
Traditionally, the Tonnage Clause has been interpreted to apply broadly 
to any duty on a ship charged “for the privilege of entering, lying in, or 
trading in a port.”15 Because the passenger fees here were levied upon the 
ships and assessed on a per-passenger basis, they fell within the purview 
of the clause.16 Moreover, the court rejected Juneau’s argument that the 
passenger fees were exempted from the Tonnage Clause as a “service 
fee,” one of the narrow classes of taxes, charges, and fees that are deemed 
permissible under this body of jurisprudence.17 The court ruled that 
Juneau may continue to collect passenger fees from visiting cruise ships, 
 
 7.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 5, at 5−8. This 
fee is comprised of a $5.00 Marine Passenger Fee and a $3.00 Port Development 
Fee, both of which are contested by CLIAA. Id. These fees are assessed to each of 
the 1,000,000 cruise line tourists who visit the city. See id. 
 8.  See generally id. CLIAA’s complaint raises questions of law under the U.S. 
Constitution’s Tonnage Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Rivers and 
Harbors Act. See id. at 8−12 (describing each cause of action). 
 9.  Id. at 9. 
 10.  See generally id. 
 11.  See CLIA Alaska Files Suit Over $10 Million Whale Sculpture and Artificial 
Island (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.cliaalaska.org/2016/04/clia-alaska-
challenges-juneau-passenger-entry-fee-cites-10-million-artificial-island-project-
as-unconstitutional/ (advertising on the CLIAA website that the industry is 
litigating the issue over the whale and artificial island). 
 12.  No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210665 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 
2018) [hereinafter Cruise Lines International]. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. As will be discussed infra Part I, a duty of 
tonnage was historically recognized as any tax that was levied against a vessel for 
the privilege of entering port. 
 15.  See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009). In this case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance in the City of Valdez that charged 
oil tankers a fee for using the city’s ports. Id. at 16.  Interestingly, Polar Tankers was 
the first Tonnage Clause case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court since 1935. Erik M. 
Jensen, Quirky Constitutional Provisions Matter: The Tonnage Clause, Polar Tankers, 
and State Taxation of Commerce, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 670 (2011). 
 16.  Cruise Lines International, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210665, at *11. 
 17.  Id. at *14−16. 
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but that it would be strictly limited in how it spends those fees.18 Juneau 
would only be able to spend passenger fees on projects that directly 
benefit the cruise vessels themselves.19  Although the City contemplated 
appealing this decision, Juneau and CLIAA ultimately announced a 
settlement to this lawsuit.20 The settlement allows Juneau to continue 
collecting and spending passenger fees, but requires them to consult with 
CLIAA before raising the fees or spending them on new projects in the 
future.21 
This Note argues that although Juneau and CLIAA settled their 
dispute here, the Alaska District Court’s holding in Cruise Lines 
International may still be harmful to the Alaska tourism industry, and 
unfair to Alaska citizens. The case narrowed the kinds of charges that are 
permissible as “service fees” in a way that stands to invalidate passenger 
fees in other Alaska cities.22 Juneau’s passenger fees closely mirror a 
statewide head tax charged to cruise lines by the Alaska state 
government, as well as other comparable fees assessed by similarly 
situated Alaska port cities.23 Though the cruise line industry may be 
hesitant to litigate against these laws in the immediate wake of this 
decision, they ultimately may use the district court’s holding as precedent 
to mount a new attack against other laws of this kind in Alaska.24 Many 
 
 18.  Id. at *46. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See Juneau Assembly Accepts Settlement Agreement with Cruise Industry, 
ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.alaskapublic.org/ 
2019/03/25/juneau-assembly-accepts-settlement-agreement-with-cruise-
industry/ (describing the Juneau Assembly’s vote to end the three-year legal 
battle with CLIAA); see also 2019 CLIA v. CBJ Settlement Agreement, 
https://packet.cbjak.org/CoverSheet.aspx?ItemID=6766&MeetingID=1087 (last 
visited May 1, 2019) [hereinafter Juneau Settlement]. 
 21.  See Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 7 (“the Parties shall endeavor to 
meet in person to discuss in good-faith any new proposed projects and services 
for which Fees are sought to be expended in the following Fiscal Year with the 
ultimate decision resting with the Assembly.”). 
 22.  See Jacob Resneck, Cruise Industry’s Juneau Lawsuit Could Set Wider 
Precedent, KTOO PUB. MEDIA (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.ktoo.org/2017/ 
11/01/cruise-industrys-juneau-lawsuit-set-wider-precedent/ (discussing the 
other Alaska city and state laws that may be susceptible to attacks as violations of 
the Tonnage Clause). 
 23.  Ten years ago, CLIAA’s predecessor organization—the Alaska Cruise 
Association—challenged the state’s Commercial Passenger Vehicle excise tax as a 
violation of the Tonnage Clause, but dropped the litigation when the state agreed 
to lower the tax. See Paul Motter, Breaking Down the Alaska Head Tax, 
CRUISEMATES, http://cwww.cruisemates.com/articles/feature/Alaska- 
Cruise-Tax-072310.cfm (last visited May 1, 2019). 
 24.  Resneck, supra note 22. Indeed, many state officials believed that this was 
CLIAA’s intention from the outset. See, e.g., id. Former Juneau City Attorney Amy 
Mead said, “If it were just a Juneau case, their motion would be tied to very 
specific expenditures and this case would all be about very specific 
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Alaska cities may become economically imperiled if these laws are struck 
down; this would be an inequitable outcome in light of the historical 
relationship between the parties.25 
This Note seeks to identify a way for Juneau and Alaska 
policymakers to secure long-term protections for the Alaska tourism 
industry against this disruptive Tonnage Clause jurisprudence. 
Specifically, it argues that Juneau and Alaska should appeal to the U.S. 
Congress for recourse. The Tonnage Clause expressly endows Congress 
with the ability to grant cities and states with the right to charge duties of 
Tonnage.26 Congress has not addressed whether Juneau or Alaska may 
collect passenger fees,27 but its intervention here could ensure that each 
parties’ best interests are protected. On the one hand, it would benefit 
Alaska by ensuring that its cities do not lose much-needed revenue from 
tourism fees.28 At the same time, Congress could set the fee with a 
standard formula that would protect the cruise lines against sudden or 
unexpected increases in the passenger fees.29 Finally, congressional action 
here would act as a back-stop to the Juneau-CLIAA settlement agreement, 
ensuring good faith by the parties, and protection against third-party 
intervention. The main obstacle in pursuing this path would be to get 
Congress to act in an area where it has little experience,30 nor an overt 
motive to legislate.31 However, if Congress could be persuaded to 
legislate in this domain, it could provide a lasting protection for Alaska 
tourism.32 
This Note will examine Juneau’s passenger fees in light of the 
Tonnage Clause. It will argue that because Alaska developed a 
dependence on these fees and other tourism revenue based on 
representations made by the cruise industry, Congress should grant 
 
expenditures . . . [t]hat is not how CLIA has fashioned this lawsuit. They challenge 
the constitutionality of the fees.” Id. 
 25.  See infra Part III. 
 26.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (noting that under the Tonnage Clause, 
states may pass duties of tonnage with the approval of Congress). 
 27.  Neither party has suggested that Congress granted its consent in their 
briefs, and the author could find no evidence of such consent in the U.S. Code. 
The only clear instance where Congress used its Tonnage Clause authorization 
powers occured over 200 years ago when the legislature expressly authorized 
South Carolina to collect duties of Tonnage. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 672. 
 28.  See infra Part III. 
 29. Although the Juneau-CLIAA settlement agreement seems to commit 
Juneau to consult with CLIAA before raising passenger fees in the future, it leaves 
ultimate decision-making authority with the city. See Juneau Settlement, supra 
note 20, at 7. Moreover, the cruise-industry relies on its settlement agreement with 
the state to prevent the CPV tax from raising. See ACA Settlement, infra note 160. 
 30.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 672 n.17. 
 31.  See infra Part IV. 
 32.  See id. 
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Alaska port cities the unique authority to charge passenger fees to visiting 
cruise lines, at a set rate. Part One will analyze the Court’s historical 
understanding of the scope of the Tonnage Clause. Part Two will examine 
the Cruise Lines International litigation and the court’s decision in that case. 
It will briefly examine the announced settlement agreement between 
Juneau and CLIAA. Part Three will discuss the Alaska tourism industry 
and will consider how this case may disrupt that industry and the Alaska 
economy. It will focus on other Alaska laws that may be invalidated on 
the basis of this decision. Part Four will propose a model law for passage 
by Congress that could help Alaska work around the holding in Cruise 
Lines International. It argues that policymakers in Alaska should be 
prepared to lobby Congress to pass legislation to protect revenues 
secured from cruise line tourism. Part Five provides brief concluding 
remarks. 
I. THE TONNAGE CLAUSE 
There is a long history of Tonnage Clause jurisprudence in the 
United States.33 Originally designed as a limit on state economic power,34 
the Tonnage Clause has been interpreted to bar a wide variety of taxes 
and fees levied against vessels entering state ports.35 Equally numerous, 
however, are the fees that ports charge to maritime vessels which do not 
implicate the Tonnage Clause. These non-violate charges include 
property taxes and service fees.36 The CLIAA litigation focused on 
whether passenger fees fell within one of those separate classes of 
charges, or whether Juneau was using the fees in a way that violated the 
spirit of the Founders’ Tonnage Clause prohibition.37 This Section will 
examine the underlying purposes of the Tonnage Clause, as well as the 
scope of the clause’s prohibitions. 
 
 33.  See generally Jensen, supra note 15 (describing the origins and history of 
the Tonnage Clause). 
 34.  See, e.g., Angelo J. Suozzi, The Misinterpretation of the Tonnage Clause in 
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 289, 290−92 (2009) (the 
Framers recognized “that certain states with access to shipping lanes or natural 
resources would be able to leverage their superior situation to the detriment of 
their neighbors. To that end, the Constitution that arose from the Philadelphia 
Convention contained provisions to facilitate trade among the states. Among 
these provisions was the Tonnage Clause.”). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 698−706 (discussing several classes of fees that 
are not considered duties of tonnage under the Tonnage Clause). 
 37.  See Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 210665, at *14−16 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018) (discussing whether the 
passenger fees qualified as a service fee). 
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A. A Restraint on Interstate Competition 
The U.S. Constitution was designed to establish a strong central 
government that could withstand the growing tensions and interstate 
rivalries that had begun to develop under the Articles of Confederation.38 
The Framers recognized that if each state was left to its own devices, 
conflict would arise.39 They were particularly concerned that if the states 
were given strong economic power, they would wield that power against 
one another.40 Thus, the Constitution, by design, promotes a strong 
central government with the authority to regulate the economy41 and 
commerce among the states.42 It also limits states’ control over economic 
matters.43  The Tonnage Clause is one such limitation.44 
The Framer’s designed the Tonnage Clause to prohibit individual 
states from levying taxes, without Congress’ approval, against vessels 
“for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port.”45  Notably, 
the Tonnage Clause does not restrict the federal government from issuing 
tonnage fees of its own.46 Rather, it prevents the states from taxing one 
 
 38.  See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 53 (1988) (arguing that “interstate rivalry was the 
[Constitutional] Convention’s greatest concern”). 
 39.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that without the 
Constitution, “[e]ach State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of 
commercial policy peculiar to itself.”). See also JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: 
THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 274 (2003) (addressing rumors, 
at the time, that America “would go the way of Europe, and ultimately three or 
four, or more, confederacies would spring up”). 
 40.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 41.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts . . . To coin Money, 
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights 
and Measures.”). 
 42.  See id. (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
 43.  See id. art. I, § 10 (limiting states’ economic powers through the 
prohibition that “No State shall . . . Coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any 
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts” or “pass any . . . 
law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”). 
 44.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 688−98 (arguing that the Tonnage Clause 
reinforces the Import-Export Clause and is part of a doctrine that gives primacy 
to the federal government via the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
 45.  Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 
265–66 (1935). 
 46.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 674 (noting that a federal duty of tonnage 
must only satisfy constitutional rules that apply to the national taxing power, an 
easy set of requirements for this sort of levy); see also State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 
U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 216 (1870) (suggesting that federal Tonnage Duties “have been 
imposed by Congress ever since the Federal government was organized under the 
Constitution”); 46 U.S.C. §§ 60301–12 (2008) (codifying duties of tonnage on 
foreign vessels that enter U.S. ports). 
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another competitively, as they had been able to do under the Articles of 
Confederation.47 If states wanted to institute a tax or fee against vessels 
visiting their ports, they would need congressional approval.48 
B. What Counts as Tonnage? 
The word tonnage is defined as the size or carrying capacity of a ship 
measured in tons.49 Plainly applied, the clause would only prohibit states 
from instituting taxes that charge a vessel based on its shipping capacity.50 
However, if the Tonnage Clause only proscribed levies explicitly 
measured by a vessel’s capacity, it would be easy for states to circumvent 
the prohibition, so long as they could find a surrogate metric.51 Thus, 
courts have understood “tonnage” to have a more expansive meaning, 
encompassing taxes that operate as a charge for the privilege of entering 
a port, regardless of whether that tax is based on a vessel’s tonnage per 
se.52 
While there is no bright-line rule for applying the Tonnage Clause,53 
case law over the centuries has indicated what the rule prohibits. The 
plain meaning of tonnage holds force under the clause; though not per se 
illegal, state charges that are measured by “tonnage” are often regarded 
 
 47.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 690 (noting that states were able to engage in 
“competitions of commerce” under the Articles of Confederation). 
 48.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, 
lay any Duty of Tonnage.”) (emphasis added). 
 49.  Tons were not a measure of weight. Rather, they were a measure of a 
ship’s cubic carrying capacity. See State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 
212 (“The word tonnage, as applied to American ships and vessels, means their 
entire cubical capacity, or the contents of the vessel expressed in tons of 100 cubic 
feet, as estimated and ascertained by the rules of admeasurement and 
computation prescribed by those Federal statutes.”); see also Jensen, supra note 15, 
at 682 (arguing that if the Tonnage Clause actually prohibited something other 
than levies on ships carrying goods, it would be largely redundant with the 
Import-Export Clause which has broadly interpreted prohibitions). 
 50.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 684. 
 51.  See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 458 (1849) (Grier, J., concurring) 
(arguing that if the Tonnage Clause only applied to the size of a vessel, it would 
be possible for states to tax a vessel “indirectly which she is forbidden by the 
[Tonnage Clause ] to do directly,” and thus, that a state must be forbidden from 
“effecting the same purpose by merely changing the ratio, and graduating it on 
the number of masts, or of mariners, the size and power of the steam-engine, or 
the number of passengers which she carries.”). 
 52.  See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 87 (3d ed. 1898) (arguing that states are not 
“competent to levy dues upon vessels measured by their capacity, nor indeed any 
dues at all which are imposed upon the vessels as instruments of commerce, or 
are levied for the mere privilege of trading to a port”). 
 53.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 703 (arguing that one cannot make bright-line 
distinctions in this area). 
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with increased scrutiny under the Tonnage Clause.54 By contrast, other 
taxes have been struck down even though they have been disguised. For 
example, the Supreme Court voided a tax that charged vessels a single, 
set fee, rather than a graduated tax based on the vessels’ carrying capacity 
in a seeming attempt to circumvent Tonnage Clause restrictions.55 
C. The Limits of the Tonnage Clause 
To understand the scope of the Tonnage Clause, it is helpful to know 
what kinds of taxes and fees a port may charge incoming vessels without 
implicating the clause. Property taxes are one example of a charge 
assessed to vessels entering port which are not considered duties of 
tonnage.56 Though not immediately relevant to Cruise Lines International, 
the recent Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez57 case focused on whether a 
fee charged by the City of Valdez was best characterized as a duty of 
tonnage, or a property tax.58 Similarly, courts have distinguished “service 
 
 54.  See id. at 686. 
 55.  See Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 34 (1867) (holding 
that a fee charged of every ship entering the port does not fall into the exceptions 
to the general rule designating regulation of commerce among the states to 
Congress). 
 56.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 700 (“[A] property tax levied on a vessel might 
not be a ‘duty of tonnage’ because it would not be a duty at all.”). When 
determining whether a tax to a vessel is a property tax, courts try to determine 
whether the vessel was taxed at an equal rate as compared to other properties in 
any given municipality. Id. at 701–07. 
 57.  557 U.S. 1 (2009). Some scholars have credited this case with reviving 
interest in the Tonnage Clause. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 670 (“The Tonnage 
Clause has been understudied in recent years. One reason that law reviews are 
not filled with articles on the Clause is that it had largely disappeared from 
judicial dockets.”). Tonnage Clause cases were quite common, even in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Id. Then, 
beginning in 1935, almost seventy-five years passed without a Tonnage Clause 
case reaching the Supreme Court. Id. The last Supreme Court case about the 
Tonnage Clause, before Polar Tankers, was Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex 
rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 266 (1935). Tonnage Clause cases have not 
been entirely absent from state courts during this period, though they have not 
been particularly common. A search for the exact term “Tonnage Clause” in 
LexisNexis as of February 22, 2019, delivered fifty-one cases, approximately one-
half of which were decided in the ten years since the Polar Tankers decision. This 
simple measurement is illustrative of the resurgence in Tonnage Clause interest. 
 58.  See Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. 1 (2009). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
Valdez charge violated the Tonnage Clause and was not a permissible property 
tax, though the Court was divided as to the reasoning. The plurality opinion, 
which was written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and 
Kennedy, determined that the charge was not a permissible property tax because 
it did not reach vessels “in the same manner” as it did other personal property. Id. 
at 1–16. Justice Alito concurred, writing that even if the Tonnage Clause permits 
a true, evenhanded property tax on the vessels, the tax here did not qualify as one, 
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fees” as a type of charge that is not normally implicated by the Tonnage 
Clause.59 
Service fees are those that a ship is charged “for services rendered to 
and enjoyed by the vessel.”60 If a city or state charges a visiting vessel for 
entering its ports, it does not violate the Tonnage Clause so long as the 
vessel received something in return that is reasonably related to the value 
of the charge; the charge in such a case is a service fee and not a duty of 
tonnage.61 Ironically, this exception applies even if the tax is assessed, and 
graduated, according to a vessel’s tonnage.62 
Case law around the service fee exception has shown that courts 
often act deferentially when applying the rule.63 While the legislature 
should not describe a charge as a “service fee” if it does not give a 
reciprocal service to the vessels, some courts have gone to great lengths 
to avoid second-guessing a legislature’s characterization of a fee.64 
Deference, of course, is not guaranteed. The ultimate question that courts 
ask to determine if a charge is a service fee is whether the charge acts as a 
quid pro quo.65 If a charge is primarily intended to raise revenue for a 
community, the charge is a tax or duty,66 but if it renders an equal service 
to the vessel, it is acceptable under the Tonnage Clause.67 One example of 
a common, qualifying class of service fees are fees paid for pilotage (i.e., 
the process of directing the movement of a ship by observations of 
 
and was thus an unconstitutional duty of tonnage. Id. at 19–20. Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Thomas also agreed that the charge was a duty of tonnage, 
but in their view, the personal property tax exception to the Tonnage Clause 
should not exist; thus Alaska could not circumvent the Tonnage Clause with such 
taxes here, whether or not the statute discriminated against visiting tankers. Id. at 
17–19. Justices Souter and Stevens were the lone dissenters, finding that the charge 
was a traditional property tax and thus acceptable under Tonnage Clause 
jurisprudence. Id. at 20–28. 
 59.  Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 
266 (1935). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See, e.g., Packet Co. v. City of St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423, 427–30 (1879) (The 
charges “were exacted and paid as compensation for the use of an improved 
wharf.”). 
 62.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 707. 
 63.  Id. at 708. 
 64.  Id. (describing Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882), “where the 
Supreme Court refused to look beyond the language of a municipal ordinance. 
The ordinance characterized a charge imposed on vessels using city docks as a 
wharfage fee, with the measure of the charge determined by the tonnage of the 
vessel, and the Court, over one dissent, looked no further.”). 
 65.  Id. at 703. 
 66.  See, e.g., State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 220 (1870) 
(“Beyond question the act is an act to raise revenue without any corresponding or 
equivalent benefit or advantage to the vessels taxed.”). 
 67.  Id. 
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recognizable landmarks).68 Similarly, wharfage fees69 qualify as service 
fees and do not implicate the Tonnage Clause.70 
Other fees have also qualified as fair service fees. For example, in 
Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Commission, the Supreme 
Court found that a fee used to police the harbor qualified as a service fee 
even though it was assessed based on the vessel’s tonnage.71 The Court 
reasoned that although the benefit to the ships was not as direct as in the 
pilotage and wharfage cases, the vessels nonetheless received a clear 
benefit because the local government’s police activities ensured the safety 
of the vessels. As described below, Juneau failed to convince the court in 
Cruise Lines International that its charges would qualify as a service fee, 
and thus, implicated the Tonnage Clause. 
II. CLIAA LITIGATION 
In Cruise Lines International, the District Court of Alaska held that 
Juneau’s use of passenger fees collected from visiting cruise vessels 
violated the Tonnage Clause.72 In coming to this conclusion, the court first 
determined that the fees fell among the general class of charges that were 
prohibited under the Tonnage Clause.73 The court then assessed whether 
the fees would qualify as a “service fee,” and ultimately concluded that 
 
 68.  Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (upholding a 
pilotage fee imposed upon vessels by the Port of Philadelphia). The Court noted 
that imposts on tonnage were “known to the commerce of a civilized world to be 
as distinct from fees and charges for pilotage . . . as they were from charges for 
wharfage or towage, or any other local port charges for services rendered to 
vessels or cargoes.” Id. at 314. 
 69.  According to the Federal Maritime Commission, “[w]harfage means a 
charge assessed against the cargo or vessel on all cargo passing or conveyed over, 
onto, or under wharves or between vessels and (to or from barge, lighter, or 
water), when berthed at wharf or moored in slip adjacent to wharf. Wharfage is 
solely the charge for use of wharf and does not include charges for any other 
service.” FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION, 46 CFR § 525.1(c)(23) (2018). 
 70.  Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 88 (1877) (stating a fee based on tonnage 
imposed for docking at the town’s wharf could not be considered a duty of 
tonnage); Packet Co. v. City of St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423, 429 (1879) (upholding 
wharfage fees based on tonnage because they were “paid as compensation for the 
use of an improved wharf and not for the mere privilege of stopping at the port” 
and were “reasonable in amount”); see also Suozzi, supra note 34, at 292 (“The 
Constitutional Framers could not, when they drafted the Tonnage Clause, have 
‘had in mind charges for services rendered or for conveniences furnished to 
vessels in port, which are facilities to commerce rather than hindrances to its 
freedom.’”) (citation omitted). 
 71.  296 U.S. 261 (1935). 
 72.  See generally Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 210665 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018). 
 73.  Id. at *10. 
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they did not.74 Though the court ruled that the fees were not per se 
violations of the clause, the City was enjoined from using these fees on 
anything other than services to the cruise vessels themselves.75 
Ultimately, however, Juneau settled the litigation with CLIAA. The terms 
of this settlement allow the City to continue collecting and spending 
passenger fees, subject to several restrictions described below. 
A. Juneau Passenger Fees 
The City of Juneau owns and operates two of the four cruise ship 
docks that are located in downtown Juneau.76 Each year, between May 
and September, approximately 1,000,000 cruise ship passengers enter the 
City through these docks, and the City collects about $8,000,000 in 
passenger fee revenue.77 The passenger fees Juneau levies are comprised 
of two separate fees: a Marine Passenger Fee (MPF), and a Port 
Development Fee (PDF).78 In its complaint, CLIAA collectively referred to 
these fees as “Entry Fees” and claimed that both fees were being collected 
and used in violation of the Tonnage Clause.79 
The MPF was first instituted on October 5, 1999, after Juneau voters 
approved the fee through a public initiative.80 The MPF charges cruise 
lines a $5.00 fee per cruise vessel passenger.81 By design, the MPF was 
appropriated in support of the marine passenger ship industry, though it 
was also intended to be used to mitigate the impact of tourism on local 
 
 74.  Id. at *14. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at *2 (Juneau “owns and operates the Cruise Ship Terminal and the 
Alaska Steam Ship Dock . . . the other two cruise ship docks, AJ Juneau Dock and 
Franklin Dock, are privately owned.”). 
 77.  See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, 
Cruise Lines International, supra note 12 (No. 16) (“From Fiscal Year 2012 to Fiscal 
Year 2016, CBJ has levied and collected more than $35 million in Entry Fees from 
the Cruise Lines.”). 
 78.  Id. at 5–6. 
 79.  Id. at 5–6, 9. 
 80.  Marine Passenger Fee Program, THE CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, 
https://beta.juneau.org/manager/marine-passenger-fee-program (last visited 
May 1, 2019) (This was called the Marine Passenger Fee Initiative, Proposition 1 
and was passed by a public vote.). 
 81.  CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, ALASKA, CODE CH. 69.20 et seq. [hereinafter 
JUNEAU CODE]. 
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infrastructure.82 Revenues from the MPF are placed in the Marine 
Passenger Fee Special Revenue Fund.83 
The second fee, the PDF, was passed in April 2002, and imposed a 
fee of $1.73 per arriving passenger, per day, on vessels carrying 
passengers for compensation that are not otherwise exempt.84 On January 
1, 2007, a second resolution increased the fee to $3.00.85 Revenues from 
the PDF are placed in the Port Development Special Revenue Fund.86 This 
fund, which is overseen by the City Manager, “shall be used for capital 
improvements to the downtown waterfront for the provision of service to 
the cruise ship industry.”87 
The City of Juneau has used the MPF and PDF fees to fund a variety 
of projects and services.88 Part of the MPF is allocated towards city 
services like libraries, police, the Parks and Recreation Department, the 
hospital, the City Finance Department, and the City Manager’s Office.89 
Other parts of the MPF are earmarked for specific services, such as 
downtown foot and bike police patrols, weather monitoring, downtown 
restroom cleaning, sidewalk maintenance, pay phones, security, tourism 
training services, and Air Medevacs.90 Portions of the fees also go directly 
to the docks, harbors, and general building operations.91 For example, a 
large portion of the PDF has funded the 16B project, which involved the 
construction of a new public dock and the reconstruction of the Alaska 
Steamship Wharf.92 Both funds have been used on the waterfront 
Seawalk, along with associated capital projects, like the large, bronze 
whale.93 
 
 82.  See JUNEAU CODE § 69.20.005 (The MPF was designed to “address the costs 
to the City and Borough for services and infrastructure usage by cruise ship 
passengers visiting the City and Borough, including emergency services, 
transportation impacts and recreation infrastructure use, and to mitigate impacts 
of increased utilization of City and Borough services by cruise ship passengers.”). 
 83.  JUNEAU CODE § 69.20.120(a) (“The fees collected under this chapter shall 
be placed in the marine passenger fund.”). 
 84.  City and Borough of Juneau Res. No. 2150. 
 85.  City and Borough of Juneau Res. No. 2294(b)am. While this provision was 
originally only temporary, the sunset of this resolution was repealed several years 
later. City and Borough of Juneau Res. No. 2423(b)am. 
 86.  City and Borough of Juneau Res. No. 2423(b)am § 1(c)(3) (“Proceeds of 
the fee shall be placed in the Port Development Fund.”). 
 87.  See id. § 1. Port Development Fee. 
 88.  Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
210665, at *4−6 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at *5. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at *7 n.33. 
 93.  Id. at *6 n.27. 
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B. The Litigants’ Arguments 
1. Should the Tonnage Clause Apply? 
 
In their argument, CLIAA likened the passenger fees to the oil tax 
that the Supreme Court recently struck down in Polar Tankers.94 Like the 
Valdez ordinance in that case, the passenger fees only apply to ships of a 
certain size that call at the port, and failure to pay the fee can result in the 
vessel being barred from entry to Juneau.95 CLIAA argued that because 
the charges are calculated and assessed based on the ships’ cargo—i.e., 
how many passengers the ship is carrying—the fees fall squarely within 
the historical understanding of the Tonnage Clause.96 Just as Valdez 
assessed fees directly to the ship in Polar Tanker, Juneau assesses fees 
directly to the ships, and not to the passengers individually in this case.97 
On the other hand, Juneau argued that the Polar Tanker’s analysis 
should not apply to the cruise ships that enter their port because they are 
inherently different than the oil tankers and other vessels that fall within 
the scope of the Tonnage Clause.98 In other words, Juneau argued on 
policy grounds that the Tonnage Clause should not protect cruise ships 
from fees because of the very nature of their industry.99 Juneau believed 
that a key part of the Tonnage Clause analysis was about whether the port 
was using its fees against a vessel from “less advantageously situated 
parts of the country” and that tourism was not the kind of commerce the 
clause was meant to protect.100 
2. Should Passenger Fees Fall Under the Service Fee Exception? 
 
Juneau also argued that the passenger fees in this case were best 
characterized as service fees rather than as duties of tonnage.101 Just as 
there has been no bright-line rule as to what counts as tonnage,102 courts 
have been unclear about what constitutes a service to a vessel. While the 
 
 94.  See Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment & Opposition to City & Borough of Juneau’s Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 9–16, Cruise Lines International, supra note 12 (No. 148). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See The City & Borough of Juneau and Rorie Watt’s Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 50–52, Cruise Lines International, supra note 12 (No. 118). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See id. (arguing that there is no evidence that the passenger fees are “local 
hindrances to trade and carriage by vessels”). 
 101.  Id. at 54. 
 102.  See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 15, at 673. 
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most common service fees are pilotage and wharfage fees, some courts 
have upheld fees that were directed towards services such as the policing 
of harbors and vessels,103 or to cover the cost of unloading a ship’s 
cargo.104 Juneau argued that the only difference here is that the “cargo” 
for cruise lines is their passengers.105 Consequently, they believe that the 
money spent on crossing guards, local infrastructure, and other services 
benefits the vessel both directly and indirectly via their passengers.106 It is 
on this basis that they insist the passenger fees are actually service fees.107 
CLIAA argued that Juneau’s concept of service fees is too broad and 
antithetical to the goals of the Tonnage Clause. Specifically, they believe 
that the clause only allows fees for commercial-like services rendered to 
a vessel.108 Permissible services include only those that enable a vessel’s 
movement in the flow of commerce, such as the regulation of harbor 
traffic, pilotage, wharfage, the use of locks on a navigable river, medical 
inspection of vessels, or emergency services for vessels (fire prevention, 
security, etc.).109 Fees for these types of services “are allowed because they 
do not impede a vessel’s free navigation in commerce and are only levied 
when a ‘passing vessel’ elects to use those services.”110 CLIAA argued, on 
policy grounds, that it is important not to extend the permissible bounds 
of fees acceptable under the Tonnage Clause because it would open the 
door to abuse.111 By allowing passenger fees here, they claimed that any 
municipality could charge fees to vessels so long as they could show that 
the fees were used to benefit someone or something in the community.112 
 
 103.  Id. at 707 (citing Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks 
Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 263 (1935)). 
 104.  See The City & Borough of Juneau and Rorie Watt’s Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
supra note 98, at 54 n.194. (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 314 
(1851)). 
 105.  Id. at 54. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment & Opposition to City & Borough of Juneau’s Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 16. 
 109.  Id. at 17. 
 110.  Id. (citing Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 805 F.3d 
98, 108 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
 111.  Id. at 21 (“More alarming than CBJ’s stretching of settled jurisprudence, 
however, is the far-reaching mischief in which states and localities will be able to 
engage should this Court find that any ‘charge [assessed against vessels] for 
services or conveniences provided’ is permissible under the Tonnage Clause, 
regardless of the service’s or convenience’s connection to the vessel.”). 
 112.  Id. 
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C. The District Court’s Opinion and the Path Forward for Juneau 
Ultimately, the District Court of Alaska adopted CLIAA’s Tonnage 
Clause analysis. Citing to Polar Tankers, the court reasoned that because 
the fees are imposed upon the vessels themselves,113 the Tonnage Clause 
would apply to the passenger fees.114 Similarly, the court said that while 
the Tonnage Clause does have an exception for service fees,115 the services 
had to benefit the vessel itself.116 The court rejected Juneau’s argument that 
the exception would also apply to services that were beneficial to the 
passengers of a vessel.117 Indeed, the court said that passenger benefits 
were tangential to the analysis.118 Because the passenger fees were used 
on general city services, many of which benefited cruise line tourists but 
not the ships themselves, Juneau’s use of the fees was in violation of the 
Tonnage Clause.119 
1. Effect of the Decision 
 
The District Court of Alaska decided that the MPF and PDF were not 
per se unconstitutional, and that Juneau could continue to collect these 
fees.120 However, the court enjoined the City from spending the fees on 
services that do not benefit the cruise vessels.121 The court did not 
enumerate which specific spending practices Juneau would need to 
discontinue, and immediately after the opinion, the City publicly 
contended that it would not need to change many of its spending 
practices.122 However, if the court were to clarify its opinion, Juneau 
 
 113.  Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
210665, at *11 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018) (stating that the Tonnage Clause “seeks to 
prevent states with ‘convenient ports’ from placing other States at an economic 
disadvantage by laying levies that would ‘ta[x] the consumption of their 
neighbors’”) (citing Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska, 557 U.S. 1, 7 
(2009)). 
 114.  Id. at *11–12 (The court wrote further that “[t]he prohibition against 
tonnage duties has been deemed to embrace all taxes and duties regardless of the 
name or form, and even though not measured by the tonnage of the vessel which 
operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering, trading, or lying in port.”) 
(citing Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 8). 
 115.  Id. at *16 (noting that “the Tonnage Clause does not prohibit the 
imposition and expenditure of fees imposed upon a vessel that reflect the costs of 
services provided to a vessel or which further the vessel’s marine enterprise”). 
 116.  Id. at *16–19.  
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See Suzanne Downing, Are Juneau officials misleading public about cruise 
industry lawsuit?, MUST READ ALASKA (Jan. 26, 2019), http://mustreadalaska.com 
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would likely need to discontinue its spending on services like crossing 
guards, police bike and foot patrol, security lighting, security services, 
and infrastructure investments.123 These services benefit the City and the 
tourists arriving by cruise vessels, but not the actual vessels themselves.124 
Similarly, the City would likely be prevented from using the funds on any 
future capital projects like the Seawalk or 16B—even where these projects 
are focused on harbor and dock maintenance—because they are probably 
not sufficiently relevant to the vessel to qualify as a “service fee.”125 
2. A Settlement for the City 
 
In light of the sustained divisiveness over the City’s spending 
practices, and the continued threat of an appeal,126 Juneau announced a 
 
/are-juneau-officials-misleading-public-about-cruise-industry-lawsuit/. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Because the judge did not specify which projects violated the Tonnage 
Clause, city officials in Juneau were uncertain about how they could continue to 
spend the passenger fees in the future. See, e.g., Jacob Resneck, Ruling Limits How 
Juneau Can Spend Cruise Passenger Fees, KTOO PUB. MEDIA (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.ktoo.org/2018/12/06/ruling-limits-how-juneau-can-spend-
cruise-passenger-fees/. The Juneau City Manager said that the City does not 
“know exactly what this means yet and we’re still trying to digest the sum total 
of [the judge’s] order.” Id. To further investigate, Juneau opened the issue for 
public comment. Mollie Barnes, City Accepting Proposals for Marine Passenger Fee 
Proceeds, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/ 
city-accepting-proposals-for-marine-passenger-fee-proceeds/. 
 126.  Multiple Alaska municipalities offered to support Juneau’s litigation fees 
if the City were to appeal this litigation. See, e.g., Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, 
at 2 (“WHEREAS, other communities in Southeast Alaska are concerned about the 
impact of the Court Rulings on their communities and have voluntarily offered 
the CBJ monetary support to appeal the Court Rulings”). Though unavailing in 
the District Court, the policy arguments that Juneau put forward may be 
successful in an appellate court. Particularly, the District Court of Alaska, when 
identifying the underlying policies behind the Tonnage Clause, said that the 
service fee exception is justified because it “further[s] the marine enterprise” of a 
vessel. Cruise Lines International, No. 1:16-cv-0008-HRH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
210665, at *16 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2018). The court was correct that this has typically 
only applied to fees that benefit the vessel itself. See id. at 16. However, an 
appellate court might be more likely to rule that, in this context, benefits to 
passengers help to achieve that underlying goal. Indeed, because the citizens of 
Juneau and other Alaska cities are disproportionately outnumbered by the 
tourists who visit their cities, investments in infrastructure near the ports may be 
said to benefit the tourists more than the townspeople themselves. Under that 
view, a court might agree that because the fees are being spent to draw more 
tourists to Alaska by increasing the state’s beauty, the investment is being used in 
service of the cruise vessels’ “marine enterprise.” This would be a novel 
argument, but the cruise industry did not exist when the Tonnage Clause was 
written, and there is certainly room to interpret the clause more broadly than it 
has been interpreted, historically. That said, an appeal would have been a costly 
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settlement with CLIAA in March 2019.127 Under the terms of this 
agreement, the City could collect passenger fees without further objection 
from CLIAA.128 The City could continue to use these passenger fees to 
provide services and infrastructure to cruise ships including restrooms, 
signage, wayfinding, motor coach staging, crossing guards, fire and 
emergency medical services, and police patrols.129 Moreover, it may 
continue to develop the downtown waterfront in accordance with the 
Long Range Waterfront Plan.130 In exchange, the City agreed that the 
passenger fees would not increase for the next three years,131 and that the 
City would consult with CLIAA before raising the fees after that term.132 
The Agreement would last for renewing ten year periods, subject to 
written termination by either of the parties.133 This settlement agreement 
was heralded by both the City and CLIAA as a fair and equitable 
conclusion to three years of litigation.134 
III. THE EFFECT OF CRUISE LINE INTERNATIONAL ON ALASKA 
TOURISM AND PASSENGER FEES 
This Note argues that the District Court of Alaska’s holding in Cruise 
Lines International is dangerous because it may ultimately reduce or 
destroy Juneau and Alaska’s ability to profit from cruise tourism. Tourism 
and cruise revenue are among the largest sources of revenue for the State 
of Alaska.135 Traditionally, passenger fees have been a primary 
 
endeavor, and Juneau would be fighting an uphill battle with unclear chances of 
success. 
 127.  See CBJ and CLIA reach tentative agreement, ending further litigation, CITY 
AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU (Mar. 14, 2019), https://beta.juneau.org/newsroom-
item/cbj-and-clia-reach-tentative-agreement-ending-further-litigation. 
 128.  See, e.g., Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 4-7 (describing the fee 
collection and spending practices which the parties agreed are acceptable). 
 129.  Id. at 5. 
 130.  Id. at 2. 
 131.  Id. at 7. 
 132.  Id. (“The Parties agree for each and every Fiscal Year, the Parties shall 
endeavor to meet in person to discuss in good-faith any new proposed projects 
and services for which Fees are sought to be expended in the following Fiscal Year 
with the ultimate decision resting with the Assembly.”). 
 133.  Id. at 8 (“The term of this Agreement shall be ten years from the effective 
date with automatic ten year renewals unless either Party provides written notice 
to the other, sixty days prior to the renewal date, to terminate this Agreement.”). 
 134.  See Ben Hohenstatt, City and cruise line make lawsuit settlement official, 
JUNEAU EMPIRE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/city-and-
cruise-line-make-lawsuit-settlement-official/. 
 135.  See ALASKA DEP’T OF COM., CMTY., AND ECON. DEV., 2017 ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF ALASKA’S VISITOR INDUSTRY 2 (2018), https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/ 
web/Portals/6/pub/TourismResearch/VisitorImpacts2016-17Report11_2_18 
.pdf?ver=2018-11-14-120855-690 (“The 43,300 jobs connected to Alaska’s visitor 
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mechanism for revenue collection in Juneau and for Alaska.136 Though the 
settlement bars CLIAA from litigating against Juneau’s passenger fees for 
ten years, it leaves other Alaska laws exposed to future suits,137 and thus, 
may ultimately be disruptive to the Alaska economy.138 Moreover, the 
terms of the settlement seem to leave the passenger fees open to attack, 
simply at a later date.139 This Section argues that in light of the state’s past 
dealings with the cruise industry, the holding in Cruise Line International, 
and the subsequent settlement agreement represent an unsatisfactory 
outcome for the City. Ultimately, the City should seek additional 
protections to safeguard its tourism interests. 
A. Alaska Tourism 
Tourism benefits the state economy in direct and indirect ways. 
Indirectly, tourism generates revenue in the form of increased economic 
activity and job growth. Visiting tourists rent vehicles, use local lodging, 
take tours, buy gifts, and consume food and beverages.140  Individual 
municipalities often benefit from this spending.141 Tourism also leads to 
growth through the development of local jobs. In Juneau, the tourism 
industry is one of the largest employers in the city, and the sector 
continues to grow.142 It is similarly large in Sitka,143 where a community 
 
industry represented 10 percent of total statewide employment in 2017. Total 
visitor industry-related labor income of $1.5 billion represented 5 percent of the 
statewide total.”). 
 136.  See e.g., ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIV., ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2018), 
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/reports/AnnualReport.aspx?
Year=2017#program40170 (showing that the state’s CPV excise tax is one of the 
state’s ten largest sources of revenue). 
 137.  See, e.g., Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 2 (“The Parties also 
acknowledge that CBJ’s Marine Passenger Fee and Port Development Fee are fees 
imposed upon a vessel, and not fees imposed upon a passenger like the State 
Commercial Passenger Vessel excise tax.”). 
 138.  See ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIV., supra note 136 (The CPV 
passenger fee collected by the state accounted for almost 2% of the state’s total 
revenue and was the only item in the state’s official statement of revenues 
collected which explicitly accounted for tourism revenue). 
 139.  See, e.g., Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 8. 
 140.  See 2017 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ALASKA’S VISITOR INDUSTRY, supra note 135, 
at 10–11. These activities collectively accounted for $2.2 billion in visitor spending. 
Id. at 9. 
 141.  Id. at 3 (“Revenues accruing to municipalities from Alaska’s out-of-state 
visitor industry are estimated at $88.5 million in 2017, including $37.6 million in 
sales tax revenues, $32.2 million in lodging tax revenues, and $17.8 million in 
dockage/moorage payments.”). 
 142.  See e.g., TRAVEL JUNEAU, JUNEAU VISITOR PROFILE AND ECONOMIC IMPARCT 
STUDY 2016 5 (2016) (noting that “[v]isitor industry spending-related employment 
(2,800 jobs) represented roughly 12 percent of total Juneau employment”). 
 143.  See Evan Jordan et al., Coping with Tourism: The Case of Sitka, Alaska, TRAVEL 
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of only 9000 people accommodates around 250,000 cruise passengers 
every year.144 The tourism industry employed about 14% of Sitka’s 
workforce and accounted for about nine percent of total work earnings in 
the city in 2016.145 Cruise tourism has also become the dominant industry 
in Ketchikan.146 
The primary economic benefits of cruise tourism come from 
revenues generated via direct payments from the cruise industry to the 
cities and state. Just as the state charges the oil industry for its production, 
the mining industry for licensing fees, and the fishing industry for catch 
size, the state uses passenger fees to collect its fair share from the cruise 
industry.147 These fees are the only mechanism by which state and local 
governments collect “direct” tourism revenue, and thus, they are 
incredibly important for the state’s economy.148 In 2017, for example, state 
taxes levied upon cruise vessels through the Alaska Commercial 
Passenger Vessel (CPV) Excise Tax accounted for almost two percent of 
the state’s total revenue.149 At the municipal level, the CPV and passenger 
fees combined represent nearly five percent of some city budgets.150 
 
AND TOURISM RESEARCH ASS’N (2016) https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1672&context=ttra (“Sitka is an island community in 
[southeast] Alaska, populated by slightly less than 9,000 residents as of the turn 
of the millennium, making it the fourth largest city in Alaska.”). The citizens live 
with a ratio of one resident for every twenty-five cruise passengers. See id. 
 144.  Id.; see also CITY OF SITKA, SITKA COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 2030, PUBLIC 
HEARING DRAFT (2018), http://www.cityofsitka.com/government/departments/ 
planning/documents/TechnicalPlanDraft8Feb2018.pdf. 
 145.  Id. at 45. This equals about 800 workers and $23 million. See id. 
 146.  See CITY OF KETCHIKAN, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2016 5 (2017), 
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/dcra/dcrarepoext/RepoPubs/FinDocs/Ke
tchikanCY2016Audit.pdf (“Ketchikan’s most dominant economic sector is 
tourism and its popularity as a major port of call for large cruise ships and their 
passengers continues to grow.”). 
 147.  See ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIV., ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2018), 
http://www.tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/reports/AnnualReport.aspx?
Year=2017#program40170 (showing that oil, mining and fishing create a large 
portion of the state’s annual revenue; similarly, passenger fees are among the 
state’s ten largest sources of revenue). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  In its 2018 biennial budget, Juneau projected that it would have 
approximately $320,000,000 in revenue. CITY AND BOROUGH OF JUNEAU, BIENNIAL 
BUDGET ADOPTED FISCAL YEAR 2018 DOC-2 1 (2018), http://www.juneau.org/fin 
anceftp/documents/FY18BudgetBookAdopted-ForInternet.pdf. The passenger 
fees at issue in this litigation account for approximately $8,000,000 of the total 
anticipated revenue. Id. at 33–34. Combined with the $5,000,000 annual passenger 
fees collected from the state, these fees represent 4% of the budget. 
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B. The Growth of the Alaska Tourism Industry Was Planned 
In Cruise Lines International, Juneau argued that CLIAA should not 
be able to enjoin the City’s passenger fees because it was the cruise 
industry itself that persuaded Juneau to pass those fees.151 Though this 
argument was rejected, it has merit. The rise of cruise tourism in Alaska 
was a planned process which required Alaska cities to consciously elect 
to work with the tourism industry. In Sitka, for example, after the city’s 
pulp mill closed in the 1990s, residents carefully weighed their options for 
reinvesting in their community.152 They chose to invest in tourism after 
meeting and planning with representatives of the cruise industry.153 
Similarly, the citizens of Ketchikan consciously turned to cruise tourism 
as a community investment after some of its local pulp mills closed in the 
1990s.154 The city has focused its development on accommodating this 
industry and the tourists that the cruises bring to the city.155 Likewise, 
Juneau only agreed to pass the MPF and PDF after the Northwest Cruise 
Association endorsed the acts and persuaded the city to use the fees to 
maintain local infrastructure.156 In partnership with the cruise 
organizations, Sitka, Juneau, and similarly situated port cities invested in 
local infrastructure in order to support the annual influx of visitors to the 
state.157 
 
 151.  See generally The City & Borough of Juneau and Rorie Watt’s Cross Motion 
for Summary Judgment & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 98. Juneau asserted that CLIAA should be prevented from 
pursuing its claims based on theories of waiver, laches, equitable estoppel, and 
quasi estoppel. Id. 
 152.  See Evan Jordan, supra note 143, at *5 (“Tourism planning started with a 
public forum in 1994 when the pulp mill was closing.”). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See, e.g., Melissa Block, Leaving Timber Behind, An Alaska Town Turns to 
Tourism, NPR (May 17, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/17/528453624/ 
leaving-timber-behind-an-alaska-town-turns-to-tourism (describing the 
transition away from pulp mills). 
 155.  See, e.g., CITY OF KETCHIKAN, supra note 146, at 5 (“The growth in tourism 
has led local government and private businesses to make significant investments 
in the land-based facilities and port infrastructure necessary to accommodate the 
needs of the industry.”). 
 156.  See The City & Borough of Juneau and Rorie Watt’s Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 
supra note 98, at 7–10. A representative of the Northwest Cruise Association, the 
Plaintiff’s predecessor, unequivocally endorsed the PDF Resolution when it was 
being considered and confirmed the support of colleagues in the industry. Id. 
 157.  See, e.g., CITY OF KETCHIKAN, supra note 146, at 5 (“The City invested over 
$40 million in 2006 to expand and improve its port berthing facilities. Private 
companies have invested millions of dollars to develop a retail complex at the 
former Spruce Mill property and Berth IV and its adjacent ground transportation 
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C. Future Threats to Alaska Tourism 
In the wake of Cruise Lines International, many laws that provide 
direct funding for the state and its port cities may be struck down.158 
Admittedly, the cruise lines would likely be reluctant to attack these laws 
immediately in the wake of the decision, due to the high costs of litigation 
and the associated media scrutiny. However, the cruise lines are not 
constrained by their settlement with Juneau from litigating against these 
fees.159 If the cruise lines ultimately wanted to attack the CPV excise tax, 
the law would be susceptible to the same criticisms that felled Juneau’s 
passenger fees in the Alaska District Court. Other port-city passenger 
fees, like those charged in Ketchikan, may also be invalidated. If these 
laws are struck down, the state and municipal economies that have 
become reliant on cruise tourism could be harshly impacted. 
1. The Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax 
 
Following the Cruise Lines International decision, cruise lines have a 
firm foundation on which to challenge the state’s CPV excise tax.160 Like 
the Juneau passenger fees, the CPV excise tax is imposed on passengers 
traveling on commercial passenger vessels.161 The $34.50 fee is collected 
at the cruise ships’ first port-of-call,162 then the fees are distributed 
 
area. The City recently completed phase three of a $26 million four-phase project 
to replace Berths I and II.”). 
 158.  It is possible that the cities and state will unilaterally change their 
passenger fee collection and spending practices in order to comply with the 
decision. See, e.g., Resneck, supra note 125 (suggesting that the state attorney 
general may give guidance to municipalities about how to spend CPV funds). 
 159.  The Settlement Agreement specifically distinguishes Juneau’s Passenger 
Fees from the CPV tax. See, Juneau Settlement, supra note 20, at 2. Moreover, 
although the settlement does protect Juneau from litigation by CLIAA or CLIAA’s 
successor organizations, it does not protect the city’s passenger fees from 
challenges from other third parties. See id. 
 160.  In fact, CLIAA’s predecessor organization, the Alaska Cruise Association, 
already challenged the CPV as a violation of the Tonnage Clause in 2009. See 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Alaska Cruise Association v. 
Patrick Galvin, No. 3:09-cv- (D. Alaska Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.sitnews.us/ 
0909news/092109/ComplaintRelief.pdf [hereinafter ACA Complaint].  They only 
dropped the lawsuit when Alaska governor Sean Parnell agreed to lower the rate 
of the CPV. See 2010 ACA Settlement Agreement, http://www.law.state.ak. 
us/pdf/press/041310-ACAagreement.pdf.  
 161.  See ACA Complaint, supra note 160. The CPV only applies to those cruise 
lines that provide overnight accommodations, that anchor or moor on the state’s 
marine water with the intent to allow passengers to embark or disembark, and in 
the cases where a voyage lasts more than seventy-two hours on the state’s marine 
water. Id. As a practical matter, this applies to most cruise lines. 
 162.  See ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX DIV., supra note 136 (“The Department 
of Revenue’s Tax Division deposits all proceeds from the CPV excise tax into the 
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between the state and the first seven port communities that the ships 
visit.163 The cities and boroughs can each receive up to $2.50 per 
passenger.164 Between 2007 and 2016, this tax was shared with 17 city or 
borough governments.165 
The cruise industry has already threatened to challenge the CPV on 
one prior occasion.166 In 2009, the Alaska Cruise Association filed a 
complaint in the District Court of Alaska against the CPV.167 Their first 
claim for relief was that the CPV violated the Tonnage Clause.168 At the 
time, they were persuaded to drop the suit when the state agreed to lower 
the CPV tax rate.169 Now, however, CLIAA has clear grounds on which to 
sue. 
If the cruise industry revamps its challenge against the CPV, the law 
will likely fall. Like the Juneau passenger fees, there are no clear 
restrictions on how cities may use the CPV funds once they are 
distributed to the different ports-of-call;170 in many cities, they are 
commingled with the city’s general funds.171 Likewise, the state has used 
the CPV on a wide variety of projects, many unrelated to the cruise 
industry in general.172 A court would likely find that the tax was under 
the purview of the Tonnage Clause and that it could not qualify under the 
service fee exception, nor any other exception recognized by the courts.173 
 
Commercial Vessel Passenger (CVP) tax account in the General Fund. Subject to 
appropriation by the Legislature from this account, the division distributes $5 per 
passenger to each of the first seven ports of call in Alaska.”). 
 163.  Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax: Community Needs, Priorities, Shared 
Revenue, and Expenditures, ALASKA DEP’T OF COM., CMTY., AND ECON. DEV. (Feb. 
2017) at 2, https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/6/pub/Tourism 
Research/00%20FULL%20CPV%20RPT%2016%202017.pdf?ver=2017-03-23-
160339-903. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. Overall, these municipalities have shared $114.3 million in CPV excise 
tax funding. Id. 
 166.  See ACA Complaint, supra note 160. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at 10. 
 169.  See Motter, supra note 23. The state lowered the fee from $46 per passenger 
to the current rate of $34.50. Id. 
 170.  See generally Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax, supra note 163 
(showing which cities benefit from CPV funding and how these communities use 
CPV funds). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See ACA Complaint, supra note 160, at 6. Proponents of the CPV explicitly 
argued for the law’s passage on the basis that it would help the state raise revenue 
by taxing visitors from out of state. Id. 
 173.  One key difference, however, is that the state is not the end-user of the 
CPV excise tax fees. See Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax, supra note 163, at 
6. Whereas Juneau collected the passenger fees and applied them for its own city-
projects, the state, in most instances, merely collects the fees and redistributes 
them between the cities. Id. 
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If this happens, Alaska could lose a full two percent of its annual revenue, 
and would collect essentially no income directly from the cruise lines or 
visitors industry. 
2. Ketchikan’s Head Tax 
 
Ketchikan, like Juneau, is one of the most visited port cities in the 
state of Alaska. With less than 10,000 full time residents,174 the city 
welcomes 1,000,000 visitors every year.175 Like Juneau, the city passed an 
additional tax to help it compensate for the burden that the tourism 
industry puts on its infrastructure and local services.176 This head tax may 
also be susceptible to challenge in the wake of the Cruise Lines International 
decision. As with the CPV excise tax and Juneau’s passenger fees, 
Ketchikan’s head tax is levied upon ships based on the number of visiting 
passengers who enter the city on a cruise vessel.177 Thus, it likely 
implicates the Tonnage Clause. That said, the city spends this money in 
ways that might allow it to qualify under the service fee exception. For 
example, the city initially used the head tax towards paying off city debt 
that it accumulated during the construction of Berths 3 and 4 of the 
downtown cruise dock.178 The head tax money has also gone directly to 
port improvement projects.179 It is unclear whether such projects would 
qualify as a service to the vessel, and thus, exempt the fees from violating 
the Tonnage Clause; Ketchikan public officials have expressed their doubt 
and concern about the issue after the Cruise Lines International ruling.180 
D. Alaska Ports Should Be Immune From Future Attack 
This Note argues that the cruise industry’s attack on Juneau’s 
passenger fees was inequitable, and that a future attack against Alaska’s 
 
 174.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION 
(2017). According to the 2017 United States census estimates, Ketchikan’s 
population is approximately 8,272. Id. 
 175.  See Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax, supra note 163, at 2. 
 176.  See KETCHIKAN, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE No. 13.10.030 (2018) (codifying 
imposition of passenger wharfage fees). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Leila Kheiry, Head Tax Lawsuit Could Affect Ketchikan, KTOO PUB. MEDIA 
(Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.ktoo.org/2016/04/16/head-tax-lawsuit-could-
affect-ketchikan/. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See Ketchikan City Officials Mull Cruise Passenger Fee Ruling, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/alaska/articles/2018-12-10/ketchikan-city-officials-mull-cruise-
passenger-fee-ruling (stating that reactions among the city council members 
“varied from wanting to talk with the industry to perhaps looking at whether to 
cap the number [of] passengers who visit”). 
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passenger laws would be unfair to the citizens of the state. If the CPV tax, 
or other municipal passenger fees are struck down, then Alaska citizens 
would bear the sole burden of maintaining their local tourism 
infrastructure without support from the cruise industry.181 While the state 
would still be able to collect and benefit from “indirect” tourism revenue, 
experience has shown that it would not be enough to sustain the expenses 
associated with this infrastructure maintenance.182 Moreover, the burdens 
on the cities would only grow over time.183 Juneau and other similarly 
 
 181.  Juneau, for example, will have to continue maintaining downtown 
sidewalks, restrooms, etc., as more than 1,000,000 visitors use these amenities 
every year.  
 182.  Before Juneau passed the MPF in 1999, there were no direct passenger fees 
in Alaska. The City, and the State, passed these laws because their early 
relationship with the cruise lines was unsustainable for Alaska municipalities, 
and the passenger fees could help the City compensate for the large impact that 
the visitors were having on the city:  
On certain days, the City may have as many as 5 ships (4 docking and 1 
lightering) in port with a potential of more than 10,000 passengers and 
crew. This can increase Juneau’s total population by one-third. The vast 
majority of cruise ship passengers visiting Juneau are either walking in 
the downtown core area or on local shore excursions. Congestion and 
noise are the issues that have generated a significant amount of concern. 
In response to these concerns, citizens approved a $5 per passenger fee 
to mitigate the impacts of large-scale tourism. These fees have been used 
for construction and maintenance of additional public restroom facilities, 
road and sidewalk improvements, harbor and dock improvements, 
increased public transportation service, noise abatement programs, 
acquisition of waterfront open space, public trail maintenance and 
security improvements.  
JUNEAU FIN. DEP’T, BUDGET HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 13 (2009), http://www.juneau. 
org/finance/FY08AdoptedBudget/Overview-Budget_History_Overview 
_FY08_Adpt.pdf (last visited May 1, 2018). 
 183.  The Alaska cruise industry has doubled in size over the last 20 years. See 
History of Alaska Cruise Industry, CRUISE LINE INT’L ASS’N, 
http://www.cliaalaska.org/economy/alaska-cruise-history/ (last visited Feb. 
16, 2019). In 1998, 560,000 tourists entered the state via cruise line, yet 1.2 million 
visitors were expected to visit in 2018. Id. If that growth continues, Alaska could 
expect to host more than 2 million annual cruise-line visitors by 2035. During this 
period, the cruise companies have earned unprecedented profits. See James 
DeTar, Here’s Why the Big 3 Cruise Lines are Seeing Strong Profits and Rising Stock 
Prices, Forbes  (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesdetar/ 
2017/08/14/heres-why-the-big-3-cruise-lines-are-seeing-strong-profits-and-
rising-stock-prices/#6719b04c214c (stating that the cruise lines that are members 
of CLIAA are experiencing record-breaking profits); see also Here’s How Much 
Cruise Ships Make Off Every Passenger, CRUZELY (Dec. 17, 2016), 
https://www.cruzely.com/heres-how-much-money-cruise-ships-make-off-
every-passenger-infographic/ (showing annual profits of $665,000,000 for Royal 
Caribbean International, a CLIAA member cruise line). Conversely, the 
populations of cities like Juneau, Sitka, and Ketchikan have remained remarkably 
stagnant over the last twenty years. See ALASKA DEP’T OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE 
DEV., 2018 POPULATION ESTIMATES BY BOROUGH, CENSUS AREA, AND ECONOMIC 
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situated cities would need to find new ways to compensate for this loss in 
revenue, which may be a difficult task.184 This is not what the state 
bargained for and it is not fair to Alaska citizens. The cruise lines should 
not be able to escape their obligations to Alaska, either now, or in ten 
years, by arguing for the invalidation of the very law they induced the 
state to pass. Alaska should look to the U.S. Congress for protection 
against future abuse. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT TO LEVY A DUTY OF TONNAGE 
This Note argues that the City and State should be prepared to seek 
congressional authorization for the collection of passenger fees.  Congress 
could use its power under the Tonnage Clause to grant Alaska, Juneau, 
and other similarly situated Alaska ports with a special permission to 
charge passenger fees; such action would benefit both the state and the 
cruise lines. For the state, whose economy is uniquely intertwined with 
tourism, express permission to charge passenger fees for a certain period 
would protect an important revenue stream against future attacks. 
Similarly, for the City of Juneau, congressional action would serve as a 
back-stop for their recent settlement agreement, protecting the fees from 
attack by third parties or from a sudden withdrawal by CLIAA from the 
agreement (e.g., at the conclusion of the first ten year renewal period). 
Finally, congressional action would benefit the cruise lines themselves by 
pegging the state fees at a set rate. This is important because an amicable 
solution that benefits both the state and the cruise industry could preserve 
their public-private partnership and prevent future discord. 
 
REGION, http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/pop/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). If 
cruise lines continue to bring tourists into Alaska at increased rates, the burden 
on each individual Alaska citizen will be intensified. 
 184.  In order to make up for the lost revenue, Alaska cities could pass a 
seasonal sales tax, cut budgeted spending, or draw from the state’s Permanent 
Dividend Fund. The state considered each of these options when trying to manage 
its recent fiscal crisis, yet found each to be wildly unpopular with the state’s 
citizens. See, e.g., Alana Samuels, The Stingiest State in the Union, THE ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/ 
alaska-budget-crisis/402775/ (describing intense opposition to some efforts to 
reduce the state’s budget deficit); Anne Hillman, Anchorage Students Rally Against 
Education Funding Cuts, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.alaska 
public.org/2015/04/16/anchorage-students-rally-against-education-funding-
cuts/. Ultimately, the problem with any of these solutions is that the costs of 
maintenance would be unfairly imposed on the Alaska citizens, while the cruise 
industry continues to reap the benefits of the cities’ investments. 
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A. A Model Tonnage Act 
This Note offers a model for endowing Alaska cities with the power 
to collect duties of tonnage for a period of twenty years. In Appendix I, it 
proposes a model act for passage. This proposal would give Juneau, 
Ketchikan, and the State of Alaska the ability to continue charging fees to 
cruise vessels based on the number of passengers that they bring to port. 
These fees would be set at a standard rate based on the current charges 
issued by the Alaska port cities; they would last for a period of twenty 
years. 
This model law is based on the only prior law in which Congress 
expressly authorized a city to assess a duty of tonnage.185 Specifically, in 
1804, South Carolina persuaded Congress to pass a law authorizing the 
state to collect tonnage duties to fund local hospital services.186 This bill 
utilizes the language of that Act to achieve the same goal.187 Like the prior 
law, it enumerates the local ordinances and names specifically which 
provisions it intends to authorize for passage. It also specifically states the 
fee rate at which the cities are allowed to charge passenger fees. As with 
the original provision, the law specifically describes which agents are 
authorized to collect the taxes from the cruise lines. Whereas the South 
Carolina law was passed for a period of three years, this model act 
authorizes Juneau, Ketchikan, and the Alaska state government to 
implement its fees for a period of twenty years. This period would allow 
the cities to plan around the future costs that they may have to bear if the 
cruise industry resumes its attack on Alaska passenger fees.188 
B. Overcoming Barriers to Passage: A Wary Congress 
One of the biggest barriers to the successful passage of a Tonnage 
Clause statute is that it is not entirely clear what congressional action 
looks like. Congress has only granted a state the power to impose a 
tonnage duty once, for a brief period of time, more than two centuries 
 
 185.  See Act of Dec. 21, 1804, 2 ACTS OF THE GEN. ASS’Y OF S.C. 553–55 (seeking 
consent of Congress to charge a duty of tonnage so it may “erect[] and support[] 
an [sic] hospital in the vicinity of Charleston for the reception and relief of sick 
and disabled seamen”). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See infra Appendix I. 
 188.  Of course, if policymakers see wisdom in allowing municipalities to 
continue spending passenger fees as they please, this model law can be 
reauthorized after its initial passage. 
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ago.189  Similarly, there is no evidence that any court has upheld a state 
statute or ordinance based on an implicit authorization from Congress.190 
It is unclear why Congress has not wielded its power to grant states 
the authority to collect tonnage duties on more than one occasion. One 
possibility is that states simply have not asked Congress to authorize 
state-tonnage duties in the past.191 Alternatively, Congress may be 
hesitant to use the power because it has only been used once, is untested, 
and could have uncertain effects on interstate commerce.192 Congress may 
also be concerned about a slippery slope issue: that by offering one state 
(e.g., Alaska) the ability to charge passenger fees to cruise lines, they 
would have to let all U.S. coastal states and port cities do the same. 
Congress may simply have no incentive to act where the benefit is only to 
an individual state and not the nation as a whole.  
Although it would likely require considerable efforts on the part of 
Alaska to persuade Congress to pass a law authorizing passenger fees, 
the payoff would be worthwhile. As demonstrated above, Alaska and its 
port cities are facing a difficult predicament and congressional action 
would result in significant benefits. Unlike other port cities in “the lower 
forty-eight,” where only a small percentage of visitors arrive to the city 
by cruise lines,193 Alaska cities are reliant on the cruise and tourism 
industries.194 Overall, the U.S. Congress is best positioned to solve this 
problem. The state has the incentive to initiate lobbying efforts and a 
model law by which to act. All they need is congressional support. 
 
 189.  See Jensen, supra note 15, at 672. This occurred when South Carolina 
sought Congress’ approval to charge a duty of tonnage so it could erect a hospital 
near Charleston. Congress permitted the city to collect a duty of tonnage for up to 
three years. Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  This is hard to measure because many lobbying efforts are not open to 
public disclosure. However, if a state had tried to do this, they might have 
followed South Carolina’s lead by publicly asking for congressional support. See 
Jensen, supra note 15, at 672 (describing how South Carolina “sought consent” for 
its tonnage duties). The author could find no public records of any state asking 
for such support. 
 192.  See supra Part I (discussing the Framers’ intentions for the Constitution). 
 193.  For example, Seattle, Los Angeles, and other port cities are much less 
reliant on cruise-tourism revenue. Indeed, many port cities in the contiguous 
United States are easily accessible via plane, highway, or train, in addition to 
cruise-line passage. But see U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, KEY WEST HARBOR 
RECONNAISSANCE REPORT, APPENDIX A 6 (2010), http://www.cityofkeywest-
fl.gov/egov/documents/1372338411_97252.pdf. Key West is a more isolated port 
city that is reliant on cruise tourism. For cities like Key West, there may be strong 
arguments for passing similar Tonnage Clause-authorizing statutes, however, 
that discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 194.  See supra Part III. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Note proposes a model law under which Congress could grant 
Alaska and its port cities the authority to charge passenger fees to visiting 
cruise lines without violating the Tonnage Clause. Because Alaska and its 
ports are uniquely reliant on cruise tourism, this would be an 
advantageous solution that would protect the Alaska economy. It would 
also yield benefits to the cruise lines. It is time for Congress to reawaken 
its Tonnage Clause authorizing powers. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
MODEL LAW TO GRANT TONNAGE CLAUSE POWERS TO ALASKA 
An act declaring the consent of Congress to grant Alaska’s State Legislature 
and its Cities the power to impose and collect a duty of tonnage from vessels 
entering its ports. 
Preamble. 
The State of Alaska, founded in 1959, is geographically separate and 
apart from the contiguous United States, and is uniquely reliant on 
tourism revenue for its sustained economic survival. The Tonnage Clause 
shall not impede the State’s collection of this revenue. 
 
This Law grants the State of Alaska, and its duly authorized cities 
Juneau and Ketchikan, with the right to continue collecting and 
appropriating fees from cruise lines for reinvestment in local 
infrastructure and tourism projects, without violating the Tonnage 
Clause. 
 
SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the consent of 
Congress be granted and declared to: 
(A) the operation of Ordinance No. 2000-01am by the City 
Council of Juneau, passed by popular initiative on October 
5 in the year 1999 titled “Marine Passenger Fee,” so far as the 
same extends to authorizing the City Council of Juneau to 
impose and levy a duty not exceeding $5.00, per passenger, 
on all ships and vessels of the United States, which shall 
arrive and be entered in the port of Juneau from any foreign 
port; 
 
(B) the operation of Res. No. 2294(b)am by the City Council of 
Juneau, passed in April of the year 2002 titled “Port 
Development Fee,” so far as the same extends to authorizing 
the City Council of Juneau to impose and levy a duty not 
exceeding $3.00, per passenger, on all ships and vessels of 
the United States, which shall arrive and be entered in the 
port of Juneau from any foreign port; 
 
(C) the operation of Ordinance No. 13.10.030 by the City Council 
of Ketchikan, passed on January 1 in the year 2007 titled 
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“Passenger Wharfage Fee,” so far as the same extends to 
authorizing the City Council of Juneau to impose and levy a 
duty not exceeding $7.00, per passenger, on all ships and 
vessels of the United States, which shall arrive and be 
entered in the port of Ketchikan from any foreign port; 
 
(D) the operation of Alaska Statutes 43.52.200–295 by the State 
legislature of Alaska, passed on December 17 in the year 
2006 titled “Commercial Passenger Vessel Excise Tax,” so far 
as the same extends to authorizing the Alaska Port Cities to 
impose and levy a duty of $34.50, per passenger, of all ships 
and vessels of the United States, which shall arrive and be 
entered in the Alaska port cities from any foreign port; 
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, that the collectors of Juneau, 
Ketchikan, and other Alaska municipalities and their duly authorized 
port-representatives, may hereby collect the duties that are authorized by 
this act, and pay the same to such persons as shall be authorized to receive 
the duty on behalf of the state. 
 
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, that this act shall be in force for 
twenty years, and from thence to the end of the next session of Congress 
thereafter, subject to renewal by this Congress. 
 
 
